According to American sources, to date, only 20% of Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan are ideologically motivated. Since 2004, the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), under the control of NATO, have made considerable progress in developing their own counterinsurgency strategies and in learning lessons from the past. But the military coalition has not yet achieved significant results. In fact, the situation in Afghanistan is more and more critical and the August elections, which indicate that Hamid Karzai has in all likelihood been reelected, albeit amid allegations of widespread fraud, will not bring about a turnaround in the conflict in the short term.

An important step forward was made with the adoption of the counterinsurgency strategy–-known as clear-hold-build approach –- by NATO forces in 2007. This strategy draws from General David Petraeus’ experience in Iraq, where he served as Commander of Multi-National Force – Iraq, from February 2007 to September 2008. Overseeing all coalition troops, General Petraeus gained renown for bringing stabilization to Iraq through a succession of “surge operations” designed to eliminate enemy activity in Baghdad and its environs by knocking over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously.

According to this strategy, NATO forces must focus on the protection of civilian Afghans and shun from solely tracking down and eliminating insurgents belonging to Al Qaeda. First, they must identify regions with a high prospect of development (“shaping”);  second, they must follow with the dispatch of military units to clear the area of current and potential enemies (“clearing”); and third, they have to maintain their positions in order to protect, inter alia, the local population against terrorist attacks (“holding”). This strategy has to be implemented jointly by Western and Afghan security forces. The final stage consists of implementing the reconstruction phase (“building”) with the support of provincial reconstruction teams, and through mechanisms of cooperation between Afghan military forces and civilians and the involvement of various international organizations, governmental and otherwise. The ultimate goal is to isolate the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups from the population, so that the Afghan Government can regain the “hearts and minds” of local people.

Only after having performed the task of reconstructing a sovereign and independent Afghan state and having involved all key stakeholders, domestic and foreign, can the Western coalition be in a position to tackle other major obstacles to affect the normalization of the battered country. These other obstacles are mainly drug production and trafficking, and arms proliferation. For years now the British have played a leadership role in Afghanistan in fighting the drug business. However, that has not produced significant results, in part because of the close links between the lucrative proceeds of opium trafficking and the survival of many Afghan drug families. It is estimated that as many as 12% of the population depends on the opium trade (90% of the heroin produced worldwide come from Afghanistan). Reconciling the battle against the production and trafficking of drugs on the one hand and keeping up counterinsurgency activities on the other, will be a daunting task for security forces. Until the coalition finds viable economic alternatives and brings down the level of corruption, eradicating opium cultivation will only create more poverty, discontent, and boost the number of insurgents.

It is manifestly apparent that the conflict in Afghanistan is far more multifaceted than that in Iraq and neither the Afghan Government nor NATO troops host sufficient civilian and military logistics to control substantive chunks of Afghan territory. There are simply far too few forces operating on the ground and the organizational structure to coordinate them are completely inadequate. This is mainly due to dwarfish contribution of Europeans countries and the lack of involvement of Russia and Iran in resolving the conflict.

A deeper engagement of Russia and Iran would help ease external pressure. With an increasingly insecure Pakistan where civil war is reaching boiling point, Russian territory is becoming a viable and logical alternative for the flow of military and humanitarian aid to coalition forces and international organizations active in Afghanistan. Also, with Tehran’s more consistent cooperation the forced expulsion of Afghan refugees from Iran could be stopped, bringing relief to coalition forces and international organizations in their effort to stabilize the economy and improve security. As stated repeatedly in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports, thousands of Afghans who live and work in Iran are every day sent home through Islam Qala (north) and Zaranj (south) border crossing points. This causes serious damage to the fragile Afghan economy which heavily relies on remittances of the more than a million Afghans working in Iran.

In addition, the independent and uncoordinated policies pursued by European states are further compounding the coalition’s undertakings. European leaders have so far accepted to station only a small number of troops in the less dangerous areas of Afghanistan and they have provided insignificant funding for the reconstruction and development of the country. The fact that most European states refuse to commit their national troops in offensive operations, designed to root out insurgents, delays the resolution of the conflict, forcing Anglo-American troops to intervene in areas of responsibility of European contingents. Tension and discontent within NATO are burgeoning as a result of these overlapping responsibilities and the timorous policy of some members. Europe, shamefully, seems unable to develop a common foreign policy and its own military force. In Afghanistan, the economic and political-military strength of the US, definitely outshines that of the European Union.

A complementary strategy to defeat the Taliban and establish peace in Afghanistan consists in creating a common front against Salafi jihadism. The solution in Afghanistan lies in subduing radical Islamic clerics. Not long ago, radical Islam’s offensive march appeared victorious on many fronts, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Iran, Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya. Now, the same movement seems largely to have stalled and its capabilities are being checked. The ‘common front’ strategy rest upon the involvement of not only Western powers but also moderate Muslim states, Russia, China, India and Iran.

To weaken, if not defeat, jihadists, however, Western states must first prevail in Afghanistan with a well thought out counterinsurgency strategy. From a military point of view, it is necessary to continue to destroy sanctuaries of Islamic extremism in Pakistan and to involve the moderate wing of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghan and Pakistani Governments alike. The core of the jihadist movement has to be reduced to silence. Likewise, allied countries should fight corruption within Afghan Government ranks, invest in infrastructure to revive an economy ruined by decades of wars. After all, NATO coalition’s political-military aim boils down to this: security, reconstruction, development and good governance.