China’s climate change diplomacy is getting interesting. At the end of this year, major global negotiations in Copenhagen will hopefully reach agreement on updating the framework for tackling the challenge of climate change caused by human activity. In late May, Beijing called on developed countries as a group to reduce their emissions by 40% from 1990 levels, a target which none look likely to accept. Chinese officials have since criticized Japan for setting too low a target, and separate discussions with the US and others have not led to any major breakthroughs.

Other commentators have suggested that it is China’s own position at Copenhagen that will be the most crucial in the formulation of any deal. This focus on China is a result of its status as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, a dubious distinction which Chinese officials now acknowledge. But by referring to the UN Framework’s principle of “common but differentiated” responsibilities, these officials also draw attention to China’s significantly lower per capita and historical emissions (8% of emissions from fossil fuels over the century to 2004 came from China) in an attempt to reduce the pressure on Beijing. Others have noted that a substantial proportion of China’s emissions come from foreign-invested industries.

Meanwhile the so-called developed world focuses on limiting future increases in emissions, most of which will come from fast-growing economies such as China and India. This focus on growth in Chinese emissions also appears to reflect an assumption in much of the international debate that China is not as committed to the climate change agenda as those in developed economies. Recent plans set out by the Chinese authorities suggest otherwise.

In June 2007, China’s powerful National Development and Reform Commission published the country’s first national climate change action plan, well before the changes in policy by new governments in Washington and Canberra renewed hope in the international process to address climate change. In October last year Beijing followed up with a White Paper. Officials have also been looking at ideas around carbon trading within China. And the current national five-year plan features ambitious targets on energy efficiency, which will contribute to emissions reductions.

These papers make clear the domestic incentives for Beijing to reduce emissions. China is already at risk from global warming, as the Tibetan glaciers which feed and regulate many of China’s rivers begin to melt, and the country’s agriculture is vulnerable to even small changes in temperature. Partly reflecting the fact that the effects of climate change will be felt first in developing countries, China is ahead of the pack in discussing adaptation to the inevitability of some climate change. It is also well ahead of its own targets for the development of renewable energy, and may become a world leader in this field, even though this does not yet solve the problem - which the authorities admit frankly - that its economy will continue to depend on coal for the foreseeable future.

China’s domestic challenge, as a recent paper by the semi-official Chinese Academy of Sciences shows, is therefore not much different from that faced by other nations: how to balance dealing with climate change with the imperatives of development. Although these conflicting demands create fault lines in Chinese officialdom (as elsewhere), perhaps commitments at Copenhagen could be used by Beijing to promote stricter environmental behaviour domestically, rather as WTO entry was used by the central authorities to embed certain economic and legal reforms across the country. A clear Chinese emissions reduction target set at or before Copenhagen would help this process.

A wider perspective on China’s diplomacy is also relevant to preparations for Copenhagen. Beijing’s relative global influence has been increasing over the last decade, hastened by its prominent role in responses to the current financial crisis. However China’s leaders are also aware of the sensitivities its rise involves, and talk about China as a “responsible” international player, one which wants to create a “harmonious world”. One interesting test will be the extent to which China will expand its influence at Copenhagen by taking a leadership role for a wider group of developing nations.

Beijing would still prefer an international climate change deal which reflects both historical responsibility and the current international balance of political and financial power, and this will remain its aim in the run up to Copenhagen. Nonetheless, the wider diplomatic picture, combined with domestic incentives for tackling climate change, make a positive contribution by China in Copenhagen likely, perhaps even involving an explicit emissions reduction target.

Even with such a target, China may still need to do more. But so will others. None of the targets set by governments in advance of Copenhagen are sufficient to bring about a reduction in emissions which will avoid the risk of irreversible effects of climate change. We need to hope for enlightened leadership from Beijing, but also from those in Washington, Brussels, New Delhi and elsewhere.