Amidst the nuclear hubris of North Korea, there appears to be one fact that is shaping relations in the Far East today, though scarcely talked about - the progressive consolidation of President Hu Jintao's power base in China. The timing of this apparent consolidation is relevant the countdown to the 17th Party Congress has begun in earnest.

Although recent attention has been focused on Pyongyang's nuclear test and the visits of Japanese and South Korean leaders to Beijing shortly thereafter, China has maintained a steady and calm course of action in dealing with North Korea and has secured its return to six-party talks.

Hu Jintao has been exuding confidence in his recent foreign policy duties. He received Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his historic visit to Beijing, the first time a Japanese Prime Minister broke with tradition by not calling first on Washington. For Hu, it also represented moving out of the shadows of Jiang Zemin at a politically opportune moment, given the latter's deep distaste for Japan. Hu also received South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun on his second visit to China five days thereafter, and then French President Jacques Chirac on his last state visit to China before he leaves office next May.

Hu Jintao has since also received the incoming United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and pledged Beijing's full support to his new term in office beginning next year. But most impressively, Hu then hosted his biggest diplomatic event in Beijing at the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation, which saw more than thirty African Heads of State feted by Hu. The event was also touted as Beijing's "full dress rehearsal" for its biggest event, the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Hu has left for another Asian tour in November, covering Vietnam (to attend APEC summit), Laos, India and Pakistan to mark an extremely hectic end to 2006.

Critically, the Chinese leader is also fast consolidating domestic power in China in the lead-up to the shiqida (17th Party Congress) in autumn 2007. He was handed authority in the Party and Administration at the 16th Party Congress in 2002, but only obtained the chairmanship of the critical Party Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2004. These "three powers" should be confirmed at the 17th Party Congress next year, making him the undisputed leader of the "fourth generation".

Many political observers have underscored the significance of the recent sacking of Shanghai Party boss, Chen Liangyu for his links to the Shanghai pension scandal which has rocked China's financial community. Chen is a protege of former Party boss Jiang Zemin, and Hu's bold move against him was considered courageous. Since then, the net has widened to Chen's network, from businessman Zhang Rongkun (of the Formula One fame) in Shanghai, to Chief Statistician Qiu Xiaohua in Beijing.

But more importantly, Hu has also had to depend on Vice-President Zeng Qinghong and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to consolidate power internally, confirming what many Chinese political observers today believe to be the Hu-Zeng-Wen troika at the apex of China's power structure. Zeng, a close aide and protege of Jiang and belonging previously to the "Shanghai clique", has moved closer towards Hu and Wen in the past two years.

There has always been a real concern amongst the top Chinese leadership of a "disintegration" of Chinese politics to the warlord era of the 1920s and 1930s, where Beijing could not control local chieftains. Wen has now staked his claims on the central authority, and the local chieftains in Shanghai, Guangzhou or Fujian would do well to remember the political fallout of the "Chen Liangyu scandal".

Within the Party, Hu has been promoting his associates from the gongqingduan or Communist Youth League (CYL) upwards to positions of power at the provincial party and administrative levels over the past year. He also promoted ten new generals last spring, purportedly "his men" too, indicating a real consolidation of his power within military ranks, not deemed to be his traditional support base when he first took power of the CMC in 2004.

Moreover, two other politically sensitive incidents would also indicate a strengthening of Hu's power base and confidence. In January, Hu decided to allow the funeral (though limited and tightly controlled) of former Premier Zhao Ziyang to proceed. But even bolder was his November 2005 decision to rehabilitate his former mentor at the CYL, former Secretary-General of the CPC, Hu Yaobang, whose death led to the tragic Tiananmen incident of June 1989. Some observers saw Hu Yaobang's rehabilitation by Hu Jintao as indication of moving on from the Tiananmen incident, which continues to remain a sensitive subject in China.

Finally, Hu's emphasis at the Sixth Plenum of the 16th Congress in October of his "Harmonious Society" will serve as the legacy of his premiership, akin to Deng's "Four modernisation" and Jiang's "Three Represents" theory. It is now beyond doubt that Hu wants the "Harmonious Society" to outlive him, after being officially crowned at the upcoming 17th Congress.

Hu will reach the pinnacle of his domestic power at the 17th Party Congress as one of China's top leaders in its post-1949 era, overseeing a period of phenomenal economic growth for the country. What could stand in his way is the socio-economic instability that is likely to be presaged by a widening rich-poor divide as China awakens to the realities of capitalism and its accompanying discontents - precisely what the "Harmonious Society" seeks to avoid.

A completely new set of problems is also likely to emerge as China develops an international clout and stature never appreciated since the days of the Middle Kingdom. Hu Jintao has some way to go yet, but he has already laid the political foundations setting his own house in order.