India has been changing its position with regard to strategic issues primarily because of two reasons. The first reason covers the ever-growing spectre of an increasingly assertive China. Secondly, India is looking to operationalise its status as an emerging power with regard to the global order. But the predicament for India is that it cannot demonise China and it should not trust United States. These strategic realities are driving India’s emerging strategic outlook.

The month of November is continuing to host a flurry of diplomatic activity for India. The visit of Vietnamese Defence Minister in the first week, the visit of Indian Defence Minister for the First Defense Dialogue with Japan and the ensuing visit of Australian Prime Minister to India are definitive events that represent useful markers to contour India foreign policy priorities for the second term of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The comprehensive talks on security and intelligence cooperation issues with Australia shows that India is not seeking US assurance in terms of its strategic needs. Even as Manmohan Singh is hosted by President Obama this week in Washington, the Obama administration’s unclear commitment towards the Indo-US nuclear deal and the US administration’s misgivings about India’s commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have come up as major irritants that continue to dominate the much heralded Indo-US relationship.

The rise of China has been matched by a Chinese encroachment policy on Indian issues, which if not met with strong objection, is likely to increase China's influence in regard to border issues and contentious landmasses. The snub that came from India with the denial of business visas to the Chinese workers and the strong rebuttal over the issue of separate Chinese visas to people of Kashmir, have garnered domestic brownie points for UPA government. Among Indians, the vernacular press in India has stirred a lot of mistrust over Sino-Indian relations. India has been cautious, not allowing relations to deteriorate between the two countries by cheekily indicating to the Chinese that they must understand India’s democracy does not run on the whims and fancies of the government of the day in New Delhi, unlike in Beijing.

Critically, Indian strategic thinkers do not completely subscribe to the ‘String of Pearls’ theory that sees Chinese enveloping India’s interests in the Indian Ocean. In fact, India has made it clear that New Delhi will not cower in the face of absurd Chinese apprehensions about India’s rise. The recent visit of Dalai Lama to Tawang, in Arunanchal Pradesh endorses and proves India’s changed stance.

New Delhi has embarked on a strategic and diplomatic offensive to gain the same status as it had during the initial years of the Non-Aligned Movement in the mid-1950s. The winning formula today calls for an enhancement of its presence in the international sphere through economic cooperation, and this includes seeking membership in organisations like APEC, in addition to a more positive role in the East Asian Summit. Finally, India needs to play a bigger role in global concerns with regard to climate change, trade in commodities and sustaining positive dialogue in the global economic forums like the WTO.

The common question that might arise at such a juncture is whether there is any real change of stance with regard to India’s strategic priorities. After all, every Indian government in the post-Cold War period has sought to project an omni-directional foreign policy. But India’s growing linkages and engagement with the central Asian republics as well as Mongolia, South Korea and Japan today suggests that India is preparing itself for a containment strategy with regard to China. And it is deploying a safety net in a game of strategic hedging should relations between the US and China takes an ugly turn, as has happened in the past in the case of the USS Impeccable incident, or the ongoing Chinese spying claims by the US.

Many international observers have a natural tendency of comparing India with the achievements of China and almost always, in terms of per capita income, foreign exchange, civic amenities and infrastructure investment. However, India’s objectives are almost singularly directed at consolidating its presence in terms of development and its domestic growth needs. As continued economic growth catapults India into the league of the powerful nations, India has resolved to upgrade its weapon systems as well as adding the latest weaponry to its inventory.

Although the process is long drawn, India has drawn up a detailed strategic plan commensurate with defence capabilities, which would make it a formidable power within the next two decades. While its military capabilities are not at par with China, the strategy calls for building up its deterrence quotient until 2015 and to be able to project power from 2015. The benign stature of India’s military machine will remain indefinitely, even as the bureaucrats in South Block seeks to position India as a crucial swing power that is sought by all the major powers, so as to tilt any balance of power in its favour.

India, which nurtured the Nonaligned Movement to create a protective shield against the major power blocs, is again working to build strategic partnerships with varying degrees of engagement with countries like Japan, Singapore, Australia while maintaining a cautious attitude towards the US and China. The backdrop of India’s ‘Look East’ policy has been endorsed as the prime motivator of India’s economic initiatives in early 1990s that have transformed into defence cooperative frameworks in the 21^st new century. The current phase calls for a review of the ‘Look East’ policy and its extension beyond the Southeast Asian horizon.

It does appear as if India’s strategic priorities are likely to retain a measure of flexibility to deal with a constantly changing external environ. There remains a belief in India’s strategic community that the subtle change in India’s strategic outlook has been met with a convergence of major power interest, with the US, China, Japan and Russia seeking India’s attention, while India has carefully kept its cards closer to its chest. The interim prognosis is either India has got the better cards or it wants to play the psychological power game in the international sphere to the best of its capacity.