Enigma! This perhaps best explains India’s Iran policy. Both policymakers and scholars alike are caught in a web of competing interests, perceptions and readings. While the idea of India’s close ties with Iran enjoys widespread support within the country, this sentiment is often accompanied by wishful thinking, temporary amnesia or worse, strategic blindness.

Iran’s importance both within the Persian Gulf region and the wider Middle East is beyond doubt. Blessed by its size, historic legacy and natural resources, Iran remains the only country that has all the key attributes of a regional power. As highlighted by events in the Gulf region as well as in Lebanon, its reach and influence transcend its immediate boundaries.

Iran offers certain additional incentives for India. Geo-strategic proximity, historic linkage, a Shia-Muslim population, converging political interest and security calculations vis-à-vis Pakistan naturally bring both countries together. As its energy guzzling economy progresses, India’s hydrocarbon imports are growing rapidly. This makes Iran a close partner in energy security. During the visit of President Mohammed Khatami in January 2003, both countries identified hydrocarbon cooperation as a principal strategic objective. Above all, during the presidency of George W Bush, the communist parties in India added another rationale to growing Indo-Iranian ties: a fellow partner in anti-American rhetoric.

As happens with most bilateral relationships, the Indo-Iranian ties are not without hiccups. The proponents of closer ties with Iran have often chosen to ignore the pitfalls of closer cooperation, thereby faulting New Delhi for the recent ‘frost’ in relations. India’s resolution against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September 2005 has been cited as the principal reason for the downward trend. In the words of one strategic commentator associated with a state-funded think tank, bilateral relations are ‘in ruins’ mostly due to India’s omissions and commissions. For others the newly found Indian desire to befriend Washington is the culprit. Less charitable ones fault growing Indo-Israeli relations for the current state of affairs with Iran.

It is obvious that India mishandled the vote at the IAEA. Even while voting with Washington, it pretended that it was siding with Tehran. It failed to articulate its interests and concerns regarding growing international suspicions over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This diplomatic mishandling however does not hide some of India’s more primary concerns vis-à-vis Iran.

On the nuclear file, Iran has few friends. Even fair weather friends like China and Russia have long stopped endorsing Iranian position. Since February 2006, the UN Security Council adopted five resolutions over Iran’s suspected nuclear program and on all occasions, both China and Russia voted against Iran. Except for occasional support from Indonesia and Qatar, three of the five resolutions were adopted by a margin of 15-0. Even those countries, which endorse Iran’s right for peaceful use of nuclear energy, have lingering suspicions over its nuclear program. In reality therefore, India was not alone on the nuclear front and its concerns expressed through its two votes in IAEA in September 2005 and February 2006 were vindicated by subsequent measures taken by the Security Council.

Likewise, self-inflicted wounds have undermined the Iranian case on the energy front. If technological bottlenecks and American pressures were not enough, as the oil prices soared, Tehran sought to renegotiate the price of its LNG deal with India. Energy security is not just about affordable prices but supply reliability as well. While the Iranian deal got stuck in pricing bind, Qatar agreed to supply an additional 2.5 million metric tons of LNG to India, over and above its existing commitment of five million tons.

Of late, thanks to its mercurial President, Iran has evoked more negative rather than positive images. If his predecessor Khatami sought dialogue with civilizations, President Ahmadinejad hogs the media limelight for all the wrong reasons. Even Iranian elites question his blatant denial of the holocaust and periodic anti-Israeli rhetoric. Belligerent statements from his colleagues have unnerved many Arab neighbours. Many Arab rulers are equally weary of Iranian designs in Iraq in the event of a complete American pullout.

These Arab fears naturally have a bearing on how India looks at Iran. In terms of political, economic, cultural as well as energy interests, the Arab countries of the Gulf are far more vital to India than Iran alone. People who talk of India’s migrant labour in the region often forget that they are present in the Arab countries of the Gulf and not in Iran. While it does not wish to be a party to any tension between Iran and its Arab neighbours, India cannot ignore the importance of Arab factor when dealing with Iran.

If push came to shove, India could well override American and Israeli concerns vis-à-vis Iran but would probably not have the same luxury in dealing with the Arabs states. Any appreciation of India’s Iran policy devoid of its concerns and interests in the wider Arab world would thus be misleading and incomplete.