The prolonged political crisis in Myanmar is increasingly threatening the Southeast Asian regional order as well as the credibility of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The trial of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), over a bizarre charge of allowing an American intruder, John Yettaw, into her residence, is the military regime’s latest act of defiance in the face of international pressure.

Observers argue that the charge pressed against Suu Kyi was a junta plot to bar her from the upcoming general election due to be held in 2010. It will be the first election in 20 years in this military-ruled state.

The unpredictability of Myanmar’s domestic politics and the mounting confidence of the military regime urgently compel the global community to reinterpret the situation in this Southeast Asian nation, and if necessary, to readjust their policy and approach to do with the power brokers in Naypyidaw.

On the part of Myanmar, some facts must first be accepted. It is doubtful that the upcoming election will be free and fair because of the absence of the NLD.  Should the NLD participate in the election, it would likely emerge as the undisputable winner. Not all Myanmar people agree with the NLD’s ideology, but they are willing to support any political party to demonstrate their rejection of military rule. The junta is fully aware of this and will assiduously avoid a repeat of the situation in 1990, when the NLD won a landslide election.

Niggling questions remains over the contours of the post-election period, on projections concerning the forces in power, their policies and how the global community could assist Myanmar move forward. Two main opinions pertaining to the issue of legitimacy are likely to transpire. Whereas the West would probably protest the legitimacy of a new military government, ASEAN would support and work with it as part of its long-established policy of constructive engagement.

It would be a fruitless exercise to read the mind of Senior General Than Shwe, chairman of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), and therefore envisage the future of Myanmar’s politics. Than Shwe could assume that he has been the great leader who unchained Myanmar from socialism, opened up the country for foreign investment, concluded ceasefire agreements with ethnic insurgents, rebuilt a glorious Burma in the new capital, and more importantly, introduced democratisation through the constitution remaking and elections. The role of Than Shwe in post-election Myanmar is paramount. He will continue to influence domestic politics, and at the same time manipulate it to maintain his legacy.

Only the military has remained the most unified entity in Myanmar. The more the outside observers learn about it, the more they realise that they know so little. The inability to understand the military’s mentality often leads to misjudgements and misperceptions, and by extension, misguided approaches in dealing with it.

On the part of the US, a serious revision of its Myanmar policy is imperative.

Myanmar is, in the words of former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is an outpost of tyranny. But the US seems to lack a strategic stance in Myanmar, unlike in the case of North Korea or Iran. Not many policy-makers in Washington have a real interest in the Myanmar issue. The US policy toward Myanmar has therefore been perceived as rhetorical.

Suu Kyi continues to dictate the US policy toward Myanmar and US public opinion, not the other way round. Accordingly, President Barack Obama, while acknowledging the need to readjust his Myanmar policy, is unable to do so now that she is on trial. Instead of setting itself free from certain conditions inside Myanmar, the US has been held hostage by its commitment to Suu Kyi. This has prevented the US from casting a broader policy toward Myanmar.

On the part of China, seen as Myanmar’s patron, the argument that Beijing had control over Yangon and was therefore in the position to influence the military regime to genuinely commence its political reforms, is misleading everyone. In reality, the high level of China’s dependence on Myanmar’s resources and raw materials has compelled the Chinese government to compromise its position so not to upset the military junta. Economic imperatives overpower China’s global responsibility when it comes to Myanmar-Sino relations.

With the launch of the ASEAN Charter in December 2008, it has offered more room for China to express its solidarity with the grouping on a variety of issues, including the contentious democratisation in Burma. The ASEAN Charter may have become the topic of fierce debates: whether it might function effectively, or in fact, just turn out to be a toothless document. Ironically, it at least provides the Chinese leaders with a “legitimate point of reference” as China continues to engage with Burma and ASEAN at the same time.

This is because Burma is a member of ASEAN and China has long viewed ASEAN as its strategic partner. Hence, China has the responsibility to support and encourage ASEAN members’ compliance with their newly launched constitution. China will be able to refer to, or even exploit, the ASEAN Charter when it manages its relations with Burma. In doing so, Beijing can afford to restructure its Burma policy in a way that is less personalised, less elastic, but not necessarily less intimate.  

On the part of ASEAN, ultimately, the worsening situation in Myanmar will put the ASEAN Charter to the acid test, if it has not done so already. The real challenge for ASEAN rests on the question of how member states can make use of available mechanisms, indicated in the Charter, to push for changes in Myanmar. Suu Kyi’s trial and next year’s election in Myanmar will prove if the ASEAN Charter is really up to the job. So far, there is little to suggest a positive prognosis.