Last November, members of the Indonesian Presidential Advisory council dropped in on South Sulawesi to conduct a brain-storming seminar on avoiding conflict between Indonesia’s police (Polri) and members of its defence forces (TNI).

These intermittent fights often feed into the ongoing debate over security sector reform in Indonesia. The debate has long been dominated by discussion of the “dysfunctionality” of Indonesia’s security institutions, of which fights between the police and military often seem the perfect example.  Another popular point one often hears in the security sector reform debate is the so-called “grey areas” in authority between the two forces.

In fairness both points are indeed relevant issues in any discussion on the health of Indonesia’s security sector. But in all of this now old discussion over the dysfunctionality of Indonesia’s post-Suharto security system, we have arguably missed the other, equally relevant, side of the coin – how security actors in Indonesia do cooperate and what the actual division of jurisdiction is between them. This is the issue of “functionality”.

Regarding the frequency of fights between military and police personnel, commentators who track these events claim up to 100 such fights have occurred since the statutory separation of the police and military in 2000. In some ways such incidents are the physical manifestation of the tension that exists institutionally between the police and the TNI.

But while it may be true that no love is lost between the two forces, what often escapes attention is the evidence of ongoing professional cooperation.

Take for example planned operations. In security operations to secure regional and national elections (such as that being planned for the upcoming 2009 elections) TNI territorial forces are often incorporated as support elements to the police, under police command. Similarly in the nationwide transport security operations that happen every Lebaran and Christmas in Indonesia, TNI personnel (particularly from the military police) back up Polri. Such assistance as this should be something that features in the bigger picture.

We should also not lose sight of the institutions in the regions left over since the Suharto era which facilitate communication and joint planning between Polri and the TNI. Most importantly there is the Regional Leader’s Conference (or Muspida) which exists in almost every province and district in Indonesia. These forums are made up of the senior leaders of the region; the Governor or Bupati, the senior local police and army commanders and the state prosecutor. Muspida forums allow Indonesia’s state apparatus in the regions to meet and brainstorm responses to security threats. Feeding into these meetings is a separate forum, the Regional Intelligence Community (or Kominda). This forum brings together all the intelligence gathering elements that exist at the regional level (police intelligence, army territorial intelligence, BIN, local government civil service police, and the state prosecutor’s office) to pool their data, create a joint analysis on the local security situation and forward their recommendations to the Muspida. These two institutions are important points of contact for Indonesia’s security apparatus.

The second problem, the so-called “grey areas” in authority between the police and the military, is also a part of the debate which requires further examination. True, there is an argument to be made that Indonesia’s security laws do not go far enough in defining the exact job descriptions of Polri and the TNI. For example, the 2002 Law on the Police, describes part of the police’s role as maintaining “security” and “public order”, but neither of these concepts are adequately defined and delineated. Nor are there regulations on how these two forces may cooperate. So, defining exact job descriptions and determining when, how, where and under what conditions the police and (particularly) the military may individually or collectively respond to certain threats are indeed things which Indonesian law should outline, in black and white.

But to infer from this analysis that the police and the Indonesian military have no agreement over jurisdiction between them, is a wrong assumption to draw. Firstly, although Indonesia’s security laws lack certainty, there is nevertheless a very powerful normative, implicit division of jurisdiction in them. Since the legal separation of Polri and the TNI, the Indonesian police have become the main instrument of internal security management. The military have been expected to return to barracks and not to practice an independent role in day-to-day security.

By and large, both forces adhere to this interpretation of the law. But, when it comes to instances in which the two forces should cooperate, they implement old doctrine from the Suharto era. In such instances the leading sector in any security problem - invariably the police - make written requests to their counterparts in the Indonesian military for fixed numbers of personnel to be attached to the requesting party, for the duration of agreed operations. This system is termed Bawah Kendali Operasi (Underneath the Operational Control [of the leading sector]). This system is the de-facto way in which joint security operations take place in Indonesia today and, by and large, the system seems to work.

Like the fights between Indonesia’s security personnel, the debate over the dysfunctionality of the Indonesian security sector is not likely to end anytime soon. Nevertheless, the problems in cooperation and lines of jurisdiction should not be exaggerated, since there is a very clear cut division of tasks and systems for achieving institutional cooperation.