The results of the recently held five state assembly elections in India did not radically alter the political complexion of the country. The Congress Party hung on to Delhi and won in Rajasthan and Mizoram, while the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) retained Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Winning comfortably in Delhi and Mizoram and emerging as the single largest party in Rajasthan, Congress’ achievements were achieved in spite of the 26/11 Mumbai massacre. By losing more than forty assembly seats in comparison with its tally of 2003 election, the BJP’s electoral defeat was more substantial than Congress in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.

For the immediate term, the election confirmed the decisive electoral viability of two pan-Indian political parties, the Congress and BJP, in state assembly elections in spite of the growing importance of regional parties in India. The polls also confirmed that local issues counted the most in these assembly elections. However, the polls offered no clear signals for the forthcoming 2009 national election. Yet, this ‘semi-final’, as these elections were characterised in the media, provides a precursor for the final, scheduled around April 2009.

First, the verdict proved that national issues like the financial crisis, the nuclear deal or the failure of the central government to combat terrorism failed to persuade the Indian voters. The most striking revelation was perhaps the fact that voters rejected the BJP’s opportunistic newspaper advertisement in Delhi on polling day, which sought to capitalise on the 26/11 Mumbai massacre. Quite simply, Delhi’s voters decided on the basis of the performance of their politicians in power and not on the basis of their capacity to capitalise on communal tension for which the country continues to pay a heavy price.

Secondly, the results seriously challenged the simplistic ‘anti-incumbency’ notion that has led to the perception of Indian politics as a game of musical chairs. Indian voters are not theologically anti-incumbent. If the parties in power deliver, voters are likely to keep them in power for a second or even third term. There are therefore no predetermined yardsticks to persuasively explain the apparent mysteries that govern the voting patterns of the Indian electorate. Besides Mizoram where the anti-incumbency factor may have been decisive, the results clearly defy this clichéd theory. Furthermore, wins for the BJP in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, and for the Congress in Delhi unambiguously support this contention.

In fact, the most glaring example of the death of an anti-incumbency effect was the return to power of Congress in Delhi for a record third time. With sustained growth of almost 12 percent, the chief minister of Delhi was considered an able politician who would continue to pursue Delhi’s high growth trajectory. Investments in infrastructure – roads, flyovers and metro rail – brought her closer to the Delhi-electorate. In light of ‘visible development’ in Delhi, the opposition’s campaign that drew on issues like deteriorating law and order and personal security, hardly made any dent in the Congress support base.

Thirdly, the electoral results seemed to have strengthened the argument that the quality of leadership counts more that the party itself. That voters were drawn to personality was evident in the immense popularity of the sitting chief ministers of Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Whether it was Sheila Dikshit of Delhi, or Shivraj Singh Chouhan of Madhya Pradesh or Raman Singh of Chhattisgarh, the story was the same: it was their connect with the ordinary voters that yielded positive results. VK Malhotra, the BJP’s chief ministerial candidate for Delhi was hardly a match against Sheila Dikshit given her significant contribution to Delhi’s socio-economic well-being during her ten year tenure. Similarly, Raman Singh in Chhattisgarh retained his support base, more or less intact, not by clinging to the conventional BJP’s demand for ‘Ram mandir’, but by assuring a better life for the people. In his quiet but firm way, Singh or the chaawal baba (rice giver), as he was characterised by the media, reached out to his constituency by giving rice to those below poverty line at an affordable price and sometimes by pledging to free the state from Maoist violence. Unlike his Congress opponent, Ajit Jogi, Raman Singh also assured the electorate that an adequately well-equipped paramilitary force would be in place to defend the citizens against the ‘Maoist menace’ which was accepted by the voters as a genuine commitment given the support that Singh had extended to Salwa Judam (a government-sponsored anti-Maoist civilian force) during his reign as the Chhattisgarh chief minister.

Fourthly, the verdict was a serious indictment of factional politics within any party seeking to capture power. Both the major contenders, the Congress and BJP suffered major losses on this count. One of the major factors that facilitated the BJP victory in Madhya Pradesh was that the Congress had too many tall leaders vying for supremacy and it was difficult for the central leadership to project a leader who was capable of uniting the factions. Likewise, the BJP suffered the same fate in Rajasthan. The incumbent chief minister, Vasundhara Raje who was perceived to be both elitist and arrogant, alienated the RSS activists by ignoring the party while running the campaign. She was confident of her victory given her contribution to development in Rajasthan. What robbed her of victory was undoubtedly the factional feud within the party’s top leadership that did not support her to the extent she expected.

Fifthly, it was been established beyond doubt that ‘negative campaigns’ do not work. Here, the BJP suffered badly. Neither the Mumbai massacre nor the failure of the Dikshit government in Delhi in providing security to its citizens provided the BJP with political mileage. The Congress suffered on this count in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh with voters more keen on the articulation of a positive governance agenda. In fact, this perhaps explains why neither terrorism nor the staggering rate of inflation became critical issues to voters.

Finally, the euphoria over the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) as a critical player in Indian politics did not appear to be justified, as the poll results indicate. Despite its success in increasing its vote share in Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the surmise that ‘the mighty elephant’ (the BSP symbol) is likely to threaten the two pan-Indian parties seems to be overstretched. The social-engineering formula that worked favourably for the party in the 2007 state assembly election may not be adequate to sway electorates elsewhere. What brings in votes is not necessarily caste or communal calculations, but a clearly achievable development agenda. The success of the BSP in the forthcoming national election will depend exclusively on its success in providing meaningful and people-friendly governance in Uttar Pradesh. In that sense, the die is cast for the 2009 Lok Sabha election: the outcome of the general election will be either a Congress-led or a BJP-led coalition coming to power in New Delhi.