Thailand's protracted domestic turmoil has been exacerbated by growing tensions between Bangkok and Phnom Penh. The ongoing Thai-Cambodian tussle signifies for the first time that Thailand’s crisis is no longer wholly domestic but has direct foreign bearings from next door. In a series of calculated offensive manoeuvres, Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia has put the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva on the back foot. While Hun Sen has achieved several objectives, the Abhisit government has yet to define its policy goals in the escalating retaliation by both sides. The bilateral spat also poses a test for Asean’s unity and coherence in the face of the lofty Asean charter. Unless bilateral tensions cool immediately, the credibility of the Abhisit government and Asean is likely to suffer palpable blows. Hun Sen, a strongman leader of an effectively authoritarian state with perfunctory electoral legitimacy, has less to lose.
To be sure, Hun Sen’s deliberate provocation by taking sides in Thai politics was designed and timed to destabilise the Abhisit government. It began in mid-October with the Cambodian leader’s warm reception in Phnom Pehn of General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, a proxy of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. At the time, Hun Sen expressed sympathy for the exiled Thaksin, hinting the latter could find refuge in Cambodia. A week later at the Asean Summit in Thailand, Hun Sen orchestrated his second move with statements to the media indicating that Thaksin should be made an advisor to the Cambodian government. Hun Sen then returned to Phnom Penh to officially appoint Thaksin as government advisor on the economy. His fourth move was to invite Thaksin to give a lecture on 12 November in the Cambodia capital. All of these moves took place just prior to the Apec leaders’ meeting and the inaugural Asean-US summit, which Abhisit presided as Asean chair. The Thai PM was thrown off balance by the Hun Sen-Thaksin offensive.
But the Abhisit government should have responded more effectively to Hun Sen’s machinations. It should have sent clearer and louder signals that avoided unnecessary ridicule, insult, condescension, and sarcasm. Instead, Abhisit’s press conference at the Asean Summit warned Hun Sen not to be used as a pawn by Thaksin. The Cambodian ambassador should have been summoned for a verbal protest, and it should have been publicised if he failed to show up. When Hun Sen appointed Thaksin, the Abhisit government was livid and reacted severely when it should have been more measured and nuanced. It could have recalled the Thai ambassador from Phnom Penh for consultations and sent him back, not an indefinite ambassadorial withdrawal. The intensity and rapidity of Bangkok’s level of responses, including the revocation of a memorandum of understanding on overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand and suspension of aid and soft loans, made the Abhisit government appeared flustered and blustered.
Moreover, it reflected the Abhisit government’s misguided estimation of Thailand’s leverage over Cambodia and betrays its own shortcomings, which were discussed in Hun Sen’s long interview. Hun Sen has not been nice but he may have had his reasons for not being nice to the Abhisit government. And there appears little the Thai leader can do about it, as Cambodia has the upper hand with the apparent intent of broadening this spat to the regional and international arenas.
Unlike bygone years, new geopolitical realities now mean that Bangkok is merely one among many capitals in the pecking order of importance to Cambodia. China, Vietnam, Russia, Japan, and even South Korea have been instrumental players in Cambodia’s economic development. The Thai government needs to accept Cambodia’s status as an up-and-coming emerging economy after decades of war, conflict and tragedy, with more than its fair share of natural resources that beckons partners near and far, and relative political stability alongside electoral legitimacy to boot.
On the other hand, Hun Sen has hosted pent up dissatisfaction over a number of old issues, as his interview revealed. The Cambodian leader was infuriated by Abhisit’s choice of foreign minister who publicly called him a “gangster”. Abhisit’s misjudgment on his foreign minister choice doomed Thai-Cambodian relations from the start. Moreover, Hun Sen viewed the Abhisit government’s reneging on Cambodia’s registration of the ancient Preah Vihear Temple as a world heritage site as back-stabbing. And the Abhisit government did little to rein in right-wing groups from demonstrating at Preah Vihear areas, some even demanding the return of the temple which belongs to Cambodia according to international law.
With the expulsion of a Thai diplomat, the arrest of a Thai engineer on spying charges, and a virtual takeover of a Thai-owned air traffic services company, Hun Sen is upping the ante. He is settling old scores, placing high-risk bets in Thailand’s deep-seated political stalemate by allowing Thaksin to use Cambodia as a staging ground. Hun Sen’s logical conclusion of this bilateral spat is its regionalisation and internationalisation.
The bilateral ruckus has put Asean on the spot internationally, and undermines the 10-member organisation’s ambitious plans to cohere into an Asean community by 2015. If Asean cannot get its house in order and overcome intramural differences, it will have difficulty convincing the international community that it is relevant and central in East Asia’s regionalism and architecture-building.
For a way forward, Abhisit needs to come up with an overarching policy objective to locate and shape Thailand’s political and diplomatic strategy. That objective should be to bring pressure to bear on Hun Sen to disallow Thaksin use of Cambodian soil to launch and conduct political campaigns concerning Thai politics. Hun Sen needs to be persuaded out of his own calculation. Additional external pressure that it is not worth it to place bets in Thailand’s high-stakes, unpredictable environment would be another consideration. For Asean, if it cannot somehow lend a hand, its role and credibility will be eroded to the detriment of its community and charter aspirations.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.
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Thitinan Pongsudhirak
20 Nov 2009
Thailand's protracted domestic turmoil has been exacerbated by growing tensions between Bangkok and Phnom Penh. The ongoing Thai-Cambodian tussle signifies for the first time that Thailand’s crisis is no longer wholly domestic but has direct foreign bearings from next door. In a series of calculated offensive manoeuvres, Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia has put the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva on the back foot. While Hun Sen has achieved several objectives, the Abhisit government has yet to define its policy goals in the escalating retaliation by both sides. The bilateral spat also poses a test for Asean’s unity and coherence in the face of the lofty Asean charter. Unless bilateral tensions cool immediately, the credibility of the Abhisit government and Asean is likely to suffer palpable blows. Hun Sen, a strongman leader of an effectively authoritarian state with perfunctory electoral legitimacy, has less to lose.
To be sure, Hun Sen’s deliberate provocation by taking sides in Thai politics was designed and timed to destabilise the Abhisit government. It began in mid-October with the Cambodian leader’s warm reception in Phnom Pehn of General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, a proxy of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. At the time, Hun Sen expressed sympathy for the exiled Thaksin, hinting the latter could find refuge in Cambodia. A week later at the Asean Summit in Thailand, Hun Sen orchestrated his second move with statements to the media indicating that Thaksin should be made an advisor to the Cambodian government. Hun Sen then returned to Phnom Penh to officially appoint Thaksin as government advisor on the economy. His fourth move was to invite Thaksin to give a lecture on 12 November in the Cambodia capital. All of these moves took place just prior to the Apec leaders’ meeting and the inaugural Asean-US summit, which Abhisit presided as Asean chair. The Thai PM was thrown off balance by the Hun Sen-Thaksin offensive.
But the Abhisit government should have responded more effectively to Hun Sen’s machinations. It should have sent clearer and louder signals that avoided unnecessary ridicule, insult, condescension, and sarcasm. Instead, Abhisit’s press conference at the Asean Summit warned Hun Sen not to be used as a pawn by Thaksin. The Cambodian ambassador should have been summoned for a verbal protest, and it should have been publicised if he failed to show up. When Hun Sen appointed Thaksin, the Abhisit government was livid and reacted severely when it should have been more measured and nuanced. It could have recalled the Thai ambassador from Phnom Penh for consultations and sent him back, not an indefinite ambassadorial withdrawal. The intensity and rapidity of Bangkok’s level of responses, including the revocation of a memorandum of understanding on overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand and suspension of aid and soft loans, made the Abhisit government appeared flustered and blustered.
Moreover, it reflected the Abhisit government’s misguided estimation of Thailand’s leverage over Cambodia and betrays its own shortcomings, which were discussed in Hun Sen’s long interview. Hun Sen has not been nice but he may have had his reasons for not being nice to the Abhisit government. And there appears little the Thai leader can do about it, as Cambodia has the upper hand with the apparent intent of broadening this spat to the regional and international arenas.
Unlike bygone years, new geopolitical realities now mean that Bangkok is merely one among many capitals in the pecking order of importance to Cambodia. China, Vietnam, Russia, Japan, and even South Korea have been instrumental players in Cambodia’s economic development. The Thai government needs to accept Cambodia’s status as an up-and-coming emerging economy after decades of war, conflict and tragedy, with more than its fair share of natural resources that beckons partners near and far, and relative political stability alongside electoral legitimacy to boot.
On the other hand, Hun Sen has hosted pent up dissatisfaction over a number of old issues, as his interview revealed. The Cambodian leader was infuriated by Abhisit’s choice of foreign minister who publicly called him a “gangster”. Abhisit’s misjudgment on his foreign minister choice doomed Thai-Cambodian relations from the start. Moreover, Hun Sen viewed the Abhisit government’s reneging on Cambodia’s registration of the ancient Preah Vihear Temple as a world heritage site as back-stabbing. And the Abhisit government did little to rein in right-wing groups from demonstrating at Preah Vihear areas, some even demanding the return of the temple which belongs to Cambodia according to international law.
With the expulsion of a Thai diplomat, the arrest of a Thai engineer on spying charges, and a virtual takeover of a Thai-owned air traffic services company, Hun Sen is upping the ante. He is settling old scores, placing high-risk bets in Thailand’s deep-seated political stalemate by allowing Thaksin to use Cambodia as a staging ground. Hun Sen’s logical conclusion of this bilateral spat is its regionalisation and internationalisation.
The bilateral ruckus has put Asean on the spot internationally, and undermines the 10-member organisation’s ambitious plans to cohere into an Asean community by 2015. If Asean cannot get its house in order and overcome intramural differences, it will have difficulty convincing the international community that it is relevant and central in East Asia’s regionalism and architecture-building.
For a way forward, Abhisit needs to come up with an overarching policy objective to locate and shape Thailand’s political and diplomatic strategy. That objective should be to bring pressure to bear on Hun Sen to disallow Thaksin use of Cambodian soil to launch and conduct political campaigns concerning Thai politics. Hun Sen needs to be persuaded out of his own calculation. Additional external pressure that it is not worth it to place bets in Thailand’s high-stakes, unpredictable environment would be another consideration. For Asean, if it cannot somehow lend a hand, its role and credibility will be eroded to the detriment of its community and charter aspirations.