Hindsight is likely to cast Thailand’s latest military coup in September 2006 as the beginning of the country’s long endgame amidst prolonged tensions, anxieties and apprehensions as the aging and revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s glorious twilight draws to a close. That Thailand remains locked in a protracted political crisis three years after the coup suggests the generals have not succeeded in their aims. Corruption allegations and conflicts of interest are still rife. Meddling with the bureaucracy’s operations and promotions continues. Society is more polarised now than at coup time. Challenges to the monarchy, as manifested in blocked websites and lese majeste cases, have grown markedly. These four stated coup conditions have not been justified. In fact, they have exacerbated in view of the political machinations that have unfolded over the past three years.

On the face of it, the coup can be traced back to Thaksin Shinawatra’s controversial rule during 2001-06. Through the sheer force of his spectacular populist platform and leadership skills, Thaksin rocked Thailand’s established order to its foundations. But ultimately, the genesis of Thaksin and the Establishment coup that ousted him emanated from the rapid changes in Thailand’s political economy where economic growth was concentrated in and centred around Bangkok, leaving a yawning gap between the capital and upcountry which Thaksin shrewdly exposed and exploited.

After their overthrow of Thaksin, the generals, their backers and allies were not willing to grasp these fundamental socio-economic changes and the rising grassroots expectations that accompanied Thaksin’s rule. The putsch was intended not just to get rid of Thaksin but to undo his unwitting but lasting legacy in the awakening of the Thai rural masses. These previously neglected sections of the electorate became stakeholders during the Thaksin years. Their political consciousness heightened irreversibly. With a stake in the system, they have been unwilling to go away quietly, repeatedly showing up as foot soldiers of the red-shirted movement known as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship.
 
The coup-making coalition’s chief mistake was their attempt to turn back the clock to pre-Thaksin Thailand in the 1980s and 90s. This mistake has been working its way through the body politic in various manifestations. Corrective measures and pacification campaigns from the sufficiency movement and the military’s ‘moderation society’ to Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s ‘I love Thailand’ and the official TV coverage of national anthem-singing have been unable to rein in and put a lid on these newly unleashed forces of change.
 
The long trail of Thaksin’s corruption, cronyism and abuses of power meant that most Thai people did not come out to protest the coup when it took place. Apart from small groups of demonstrators in the streets of Bangkok, a wait-and-see atmosphere prevailed. The coup makers then appointed a lacklustre interim government and saw to it that the coup-making coalition is given the upper hand under a new set of rules enshrined in the 2007 constitutions to pin down the development of democratic institutions. Most baffling of all was the coup-making coalition’s unwillingness to simply acknowledge that Thaksin had to go because he was unscrupulous but that his positive legacies in popular stakeholdership would be incorporated.
 
All things considered, the military is now resurgent. Its budget has increased substantially. It has reversed many of the security sector reforms that were broached in the late 1990s, including more streamlined personnel and transparent weapons procurement. Its anachronistic agencies from the Cold War, particularly the Internal Security Operations Command, have been given new leases of life. Civil-military relations are increasingly dictated by the brass. Indeed, the generals are back, and this time they will stay and insist on their role as the self-professed protector and guardian of how Thailand shapes up in the near term.

Although it has been costly to Thailand’s democratic development, the ascendancy of the military has made the coup, despite all of its problematic consequences, worthwhile for the generals. They have also learned by doing. The results of the last coup do not encourage them to seize power directly again, which is the first-best outcome in military interventions in politics. It would be difficult to find an effective interim government to keep the economy chugging along. Thailand’s international credibility would diminish. Diplomats, investors and tourists are wary of coup-making countries. The generals themselves would lose prestige at home and abroad.

Thailand's generals have found a second-best option that has worked rather well in their scheme of things. With allies in parliament, the bureaucracy and civil society, the generals could see to it that a sitting government does not survive in the topsy-turvy political arena. This was evident in 2008 when the military chose not to follow two elected governments’ instructions. At the same time, the brass can broker and nudge forward a government of elected MPs whom they could work with and whose instructions in dealing with street protests they have duly followed. Abhisit’s government, for example, comprises elected representatives but it is not really an elected government. This is the Thai military’s nuanced and sophisticated coup-making formula tailored for the globalisation age. It is not ideal for the generals but it works under pressures and constraints at home and abroad.

The most striking development in Thailand’s coup-making circles is the coalescence of a unit-based, rather than the age-old class-based, lines of power. In the recent past, coup makers harked back to their school days as members of the same graduating class from the military academy. Class Five was infamous during the 1991-92 period, preceded by Class Seven in the 1980s. This time, anybody who is to be somebody in lines of command is likely to hail from the 21st Infantry Regiment, which is under the 2nd Infantry Division, located in the eastern provinces.

This niche of select army officers is popularly known as the ‘queen’s tiger soldiers’ or ‘eastern tigers’. Their rise and prominence have been well documented in the Thai media as public information. Coup-making considerations under the cry of nation, religion and monarchy, whether as a first-best or second-best preference, are likely to fall under their domain. As the Thai generals view the monarchy as sacrosanct, they will not shy away from first-best approach if the royal succession and monarchical traditions are jeopardised and challenged, although they will prefer second-best outcomes where possible. In doing so, the ‘tiger soldiers’ will be the force to watch in how Thailand turns out during and after the royal twilight.