Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya recently announced that Thailand would facilitate resettlement in third countries for 158 Hong refugees detained in Nong Khai province. “They are regarded as political-asylum seekers, so they have the right to request resettlement in the United States and other countries,” Kasit told reporters after his meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during his visit to the United States on 23 April 2008.
 
Kasit revealed that Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States have so far expressed willingness to absorb eligible political-asylum seekers for resettlement. He also hoped that the resettlement would help improve Thai-Lao relations that have long been plagued by lingering suspicions of Thai exploitation.
 
The issue of refugees and overlapping borders obstructed further development in this bilateral relationship. Historically, border disputes led to a military wrangle in three villages between Thailand’s Uttaradit province and the central Lao province of Sayabouri in 1984, and more serious clashes three years later at Ban Rom Klao in Pitsanulok, which Laos claimed, was also part of Sayabouri. Also known as the battle of Hill 1428, the Thai-Lao armed clashes resulted in excess of 1000 casualties in total from both sides.

Bilateral tensions gradually subsided, following the implementation of a new business-oriented policy under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan in the late 1980s. The Thai policy of the “Lao marketplace” was reciprocated by Laos’ Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane who paid a visit to Thailand in 1989. Although Chatichai successfully opened up Lao economy for Thai investors, contentious political issues continued to decelerate the strengthening of bilateral friendship.  

The first issue concerned Laotian migrants and refugees residing in temporary Thai camps. Second, Lao and Hmong resistance groups used the camps as a base to launch attacks against the Lao government, acts which further deepened suspicions between the two countries. Thailand made clear its intention to repatriate these refugees, either back to their homeland, third-country settlement, or to be classified as illegal immigrants and thus face deportation.
 
In the meantime, Laos was reluctant to welcome back the resistance. As for the refugees who were fighting for national autonomy, they avoided repatriation out of fear of reprisal from the Lao authorities. The refugee camps in Thailand were finally closed down in the late 1990s, with the final 15,000 Hmong refugees at Tham Krabok Temple granted resettlement in the United States in 2003. Both sides expected that resettlement would lead to the end of the problem.
 
They were wrong. In 2004, several thousand more Hmong, once again, fled from inside Laos to Thailand’s northern Chiang Rai and Petchaboon provinces. The Thai and Lao governments claimed that they were illegal economic migrants seeking work in more prosperous Thailand. But the refugees claimed they were fleeing continued persecution at the hands of the Lao government. These problems hassled the Thaksin government and spoiled his economic policy toward Laos. He, like Chatichai, identified economic interests in Laos amidst ongoing conflict. Attention was paid to the fact that Laos represented long-term economic opportunities because of its traditional policy of economic dependence on Thailand.

But Thailand’s foreign policy strategy to penetrate Laos with its capitalist state of mind has occasionally been perceived as a hegemonic attempt to cement Thai domination of Lao economy and society. Already, the Thai impact has been highly perceptible in Lao society, ranging from the omnipresence of Thai language, Thai television programmes and music, and the wide circulation of Thai currency. In turn, Laos has walked along a careful path, avoiding subservience to then Prime Minister Thaksin’s rule, but instead utilising its economic potential and its close relations with Vietnam and China as leverage against Thai monopoly.

No longer vulnerable, Laos has stepped up the game of bilateral politics, taking advantage of contentious issues such as the Hmong refugees and economic migrants problem, the Thai cultural domination of Laos, Thailand’s economically exploitative attitude and the conflict of interests of Thai leaders in their dealings with Laos, as a bargaining chip. This explained the reason behind Laos’s outright refusal to take back Hmong refugees who had been in political limbo in Thailand. The Hmong therefore remained a major diplomatic sticky point in the burgeoning economic relationship between Thailand and Laos.

The current policy of Thailand in facilitating the resettlement of Hmong refugees has therefore served multiple purposes. Certainly, this would greatly reduce a sense of mutual mistrust, which, especially on the part of Laos, has increased since the departure of Thaksin from Thai politics. Although Thaksin used his political power to extract benefits from his relationship with Laos, he was a close friend of Laos’ Communist regime. In concert, Laos seemed to adopt a better-the-devil-you-know attitude when it looked up to the Thai leadership. For Kasit to regain trust from his Lao counterpart, his government has to start with a clean slate. The Hmong issue has to be resolved.

Thailand’s next step is to address the corrupt practices pursed by Thai politicians as well as greedy conglomerates in their economic activities with Laos. True, the Lao generals have also been winners in acquiring profits from a corrupt Thailand. But they must realise that such profits are unsustainable and have the potential to cause long-term damage to bilateral relations.

Kasit made the first move in setting the record straight in his dealings with Lao matters. Now, it is Laos’ turn to exhibit its commitment to further advance its partnership with Thailand. This is because, at the end of the day, Thailand and Laos, according to an old saying in these parts, are inseparable brothers.