Former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s successful humanitarian mission to Pyongyang brought back Laura Ling and Euna Lee home to their loved ones. But the ramifications and implications of the 20-hour surprise trip to the hermit kingdom go beyond the mere rescue of the two jailed American journalists.

While many applauded Clinton’s role and see the journalists’ release as a potential window of opportunity to ease U.S.-DPRK tension and perhaps pave the way for North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks, critics characterize the trip as unwise and dangerous by giving the Kim Jong-il regime the spotlight it does not deserve and perhaps even creating the precedent of negotiating with terrorists.

Differences of opinions aside, there are serious questions to consider and issues to address. Clinton’s visit has refocused attention on the issue of the appropriate approach in dealing with North Korea: engagement, containment, isolation, or a combination thereof.

If the past two decades of U.S.-DPRK relations offer any clue, it becomes obvious that engagement, under the right conditions, yields important payoffs. During the Clinton administration, a policy of engagement succeeded—at least temporarily—in freezing North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and in getting Pyongyang to agree to a moratorium of ballistic missile tests.

Critics would argue that the so-called success, in the forms of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 1999 Berlin Accord, awarded the Kim Jong-il regime for what it should never have done in the first place—the violation of its own commitment under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty without in effect stopping its clandestine nuclear programs—this time around uranium enrichment that was detected in the final days of the Clinton administration.

There is some legitimacy in such arguments and indeed dealing with regimes such as North Korea always requires extra caution and realistic expectations. But the failure says as much as Pyongyang’s devious schemes as the inability—or unwillingness for that matter—on Washington’s part to deliver its end of the bargain, including the delivery of the two light-water reactors and the negotiation leading to diplomatic normalization between the two countries.

So the failure is more with the execution of the engagement policy than the approach itself. One could argue that the headways that were made in 2005 and again in 2007-2008 were the result of intense engagement by the other five countries of the Six-Party Talks process, the United States in particular, that resulted in the beginning of the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs.

Assuming engagement remains a viable approach and recognizing that execution is as much critical, what is the prospect of U.S.-DPRK relations in the aftermath of Bill Clinton’s diplomatic coup? If and how can the easing of tension lead to the resumption of bilateral dialogue and eventually to Pyongyang’s return to the multilateral de-nuclearization process?

Washington is faced with a dilemma here. If it should opt to open bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang, then it could be perceived as conceding to North Korea’s terms by bypassing the Six-Party Talks. There could be demands from the DPRK that the sanctions be lifted.

However, refusing to take part in any engagement—as the Obama administration seems to indicate, would basically mean letting go the window of opportunity. The current impasse - Pyongyang’s refusal to return to the Six-Party Talks after its nuclear and missile tests and the subsequent UN Security Council sanctions - is likely to continue.

The Obama administration should seize the opportunity, prioritize its near-term objectives, and undertake bold approaches. Given Pyongyang’s signal last week that it is willing to engage in bilateral dialogue and taking advantage of the momentum the release of the two American journalists has generated, Washington could begin to explore preliminary discussions with North Koreans via the UN venues. However, such discussions could focus on issues ranging from humanitarian assistance to North Korea’s illicit activities and even on diplomatic normalization and a peace treaty between the two countries.

Washington need to insist on Pyongyang’s fulfilling its own pledges to nuclear disarmament at the Six-Party Talks and emphasize the importance of the multilateral process as a framework to address issues critical to all the parties concerned: that the Korean Peninsular be de-nuclearized, that North Korea’s security can be assured through regional arrangements, and that the international community could offer—and deliver in good faith—the economic and energy assistance that North Korea needs. Given Pyongyang’s isolation and the difficulties it faces, it is not completely out of the question to link the prospect and progress of bilateral dialogue to the North’s return to the multilateral talks on the nuclear issue.

This will not be easy, but re-engaging North Korea on the nuclear issue is so critical that Washington and its regional partners can ill afford to let the opportunity pass. The longer the impasse, the more fissile materials Pyongyang will have produced and the greater danger of it transferring nuclear items and technologies to third parties. The suspected nuclear facility in Syria that Israel destroyed two years ago is a grave reminder that North Korea is willing to engage in nuclear proliferation activities. The recent report of the DPRK-Myanmar connection could drop another nuclear bombshell.

The Obama administration has indicated it will adopt a fresh approach in its diplomatic efforts. Now is the time to return to the diplomacy of multilateralism, engagement, and pragmatism with clear objectives and priorities. President Obama’s vision for a nuclear-free world and his bold efforts to reset the button on U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament negotiations will be undermined if the North Korean—and Iranian—nuclear issues are left unresolved. Washington should continue to insist on the Six-Party Talks as the right vehicle for discussing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, but it should not rule out the prospect of engaging Pyongyang directly.