Beyond Thaksin's Assets: The Rise of the Reds


Pongsudhirak

While all eyes on Thailand are focused on what has been touted as a doomsday Constitution Court verdict on former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s frozen THB76 billion (USD2.3 billion), the pro-Thaksin red-shirted United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) is in the midst of another build-up of street protests against the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and its supporters. The verdict on 26 February whether to confiscate all or some of Thaksin’s vast assets from the sale of his Shin Corp telecom conglomerate to Temasek Holdings in January 2006 is partly a foregone conclusion.

Thaksin surely will not be acquitted and receive all of his money back. That would undermine everything that went into his opponents’ military coup in September 2006 and its anti-Thaksin aftermath. Yet seizing all of his assets, some from before the time he entered politics, would raise eyebrows and further enrage the red shirts for what they see as gross injustice. At the same time, there have been no hints or signals that lines have been drawn to take away only part of his USD2.3 billion. Unsurprisingly, Thaksin is pulling all levers of his influence and power from exile to get his money back. But his opponents would be misguided to view the red shirts as all about Thaksin. Indeed, the influence of the reds will transcend this verdict.  

By the admission of the government spokesman, the UDD red shirts are now prevalent in no fewer than 38 of Thailand’s 76 provinces, predominantly in the populous northeast and north. But the Abhisit government, its backers in the army and elsewhere, and the yellow-shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) still do not acknowledge the claims and grievances of the red shirts. On the one hand, they are portrayed by the current Thai officialdom as merely Thaksin’s financial lackeys. On the other, they are sometimes depicted as ignorant and gullible peasants, who cannot see beyond Thaksin’s manipulative populism.  

As Thailand’s latest round of brinkmanship revs up, Thaksin has been mobilising all resources within his power to whip up red-shirted sentiments. The ringleaders of the reds have visited him time and again near and far in Dubai and Cambodia to receive instructions. His media offensive through twitter and phone-ins are on full throttle. His opponents, who hold power in Bangkok, are equally in high gear. Hardly a day goes by without official demonization and intimidation of Thaksin and the red shirts.   

That the rhetoric and ominous posturing have been ratcheted up by both sides is to be expected. The reds see the 26 February verdict as the culmination of a long offensive of injustice since the September 2006 coup. Thaksin merely symbolises their quest for social justice and their struggle for democratic rights. The opposing yellows and their allied army, government and swathes of intelligentsia see it as the final act of political decapitation short of the physical demise of a crook and a usurper.
 
But the many who believe the reds will simply sputter and run out of steam when Thaksin’s money supply runs dry are gravely mistaken. The reds have become much more organic and spontaneous than Thaksin himself could have imagined when he was ousted from power.  

Even a short visit to the reds’ northeast heartland, such as Ubon Ratchathani province, can provide glimpses of a full-blooded social movement with attendant small-scale fund-raising, symbols, assorted paraphernalia like caps and t-shirts, and pent-up anger and frustration. The reds of Ubon are split into seven groups, all with different approaches and methods but with the same arguments and objectives. Their ideology entwines Thaksin, democracy and justice.  

For some reds in that province, it is all about Thaksin, his populist policies, attention to the poor and downtrodden, and leadership that took Thailand competitively into the 21st century. For others, the top priority is not Thaksin but ‘democracy’, which was subverted when post-election winning parties that should have governed were dissolved repeatedly while losing parties and turncoat factions were given the green light to rule by the army. For all reds in Ubon, injustice and ‘double standards’ are ubiquitous in officialdom. When all parties have bought votes, dissolving fewer than all on vote fraud is seen as unfair. To them, Thaksin was corrupt just like those who came before him and who will come hereafter. They see his pro-poor policy legacy and Thailand’s modernisation for the 21st century as the difference.
 
Alarmingly, the reds in Ubon have set up UDD schools for education about justice. Some are militant and intransigent. But most still want a just and fair Thailand to be able to move forward in the world. As long as the reds are dismissed and denied, the fear-mongering of a ‘people’s army’ will find resonance and germination that are dangerous for Thailand’s medium-term horizon. Similar stories can be recounted from other rural provinces in the northeast and north. They do not include the silent fence-sitters all over the country who know that something does not add up about justice in Thailand. But they are not prepared to act.  

The pro-Abhisit coalition has been effective at disassembling and marginalising opposing views. The PAD, in particular, is an expert assassin of character, cowing and intimidating those who want to activate and broaden a middle ground for a way forward into silence. If they cannot see the reds beyond Thaksin and his assets, Thailand will see much more pain and grief in store.  

What the government spokesman should be telling his bosses and backers is not how to suppress the reds in a three-pronged strategy from local law enforcement to the draconian Internal Security Act and military-run Emergency Decree, but how to listen to these reds and wean them off Thaksin. The challenge for the government now, as it has been for Thailand’s powers-that-be since the coup, is to eliminate Thaksin for his corruption and abuses of power while accommodating his red columns for their grievances, demands and expectations. Thailand will not see peace until such accommodation take place. 

Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

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