Does terrorist lineage matter?

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S.P. Harish
21 Aug 2006
Harish

On 10 Aug 2006, British authorities arrested 24 people allegedly involved in a plot to hijack and blow-up passenger planes over the Atlantic. The identity of the perpetrators is of particular interest. Initial reports confirmed that many of them were Muslims who were British nationals. But these suspected terrorists are not just identified by their nationality. They are almost always identified as "British Muslims of Pakistani origin" or "British Muslims of Pakistani descent".

This attempt to append lineage is uncommon. When the 9/11 attackers were identified, they were branded as "Saudi Arabians". Similarly, during the Bali bombings, the perpetrators were just "Indonesians". There was no need to dwell beyond their nationality and isolate either the clan of the 9/11 terrorists or the ethnicity of the Bali bombers. But during the 7 July bombings in Britain last year, the perpetrators were readily pigeonholed as "British Muslims of Pakistani origin".

There are three important consequences of this phenomenon. First, emphasising ancestry is dubious, since it leads people to believe that only British nationals of a certain lineage are susceptible to becoming terrorists. Second, there is also a tacit assumption that British society is somehow an innocuous bystander in the violent world of international terrorism. Third, it suggests that unsound policies could be the logical consequence of the continued use of such simplistic and inappropriate terminology.

In comparison to the 7 July bombings, the "Pakistani connection" in the recent plot was more evident. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry identified one of the two men arrested in Pakistan; a Rashid Rauf, as a British national. He is said to be related to Tayid Rauf, one of those arrested in Britain. As more details of the conspiracy are made public, it is likely that the Pakistani link will again be publicised.

Suspicions that an Islamic charity based in Pakistan channelled money raised for earthquake relief to help finance the alleged plot have made headlines. Nasir Ahmed, a member of the House of Lords, alleged that some of the perpetrators might have been in contact with extremist groups in Pakistan.

While these associations may well turn out to be true, it is important to establish that the problem then lies with that particular charity and some extremist groups in Pakistan, and not with the Pakistani origin of the suspects.

This is, of course, not to deny the Pakistani descent of the perpetrators; their ancestors did migrate to Britain from Pakistan. The issue is about its relevance in the context of the terrorist plot.

If an entrepreneur of Pakistani descent strikes it rich in Britain, one wonders how much credit given to his/her ancestry.

Susceptibility to extremist dogma is not limited to British citizens of a particular lineage. It is entirely possible for a British Muslim who is not of Pakistani origin to be indoctrinated in pretty much the same way as one of Pakistani descent.

More worryingly, this readiness to refer to the perpetrators as "British Muslims of Pakistani origin" is powerful enough to shape perceptions and public opinion that can only impact the local Pakistani community negatively.

Separately, identifying the perpetrators of the terrorist threat from a particular lineage reflects a deeper conviction that the extremist threat emanates from outside Britain's borders, and that its society is an innocent spectator. For sure, Britain should not be held entirely responsible for the actions of a few misguided individuals. But equally, questions can be asked of the structural fissures in British society.

It is a delusion that extremist ideology stems only from mountains of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. One possible explanation why some British Muslims are leaning towards such extremist ideology is because Britain has not been entirely successful in integrating its Muslim community into mainstream society. It is this very space that the extremists have usurped.

One imperfect strategy that has arisen from believing that only people of a certain descent are susceptible to terrorist activities is to empower the so-called moderate Muslims. But who qualifies as a moderate Muslim? It is presently based on a shallow notion that any Muslim who rejects extremism and its terrorist offspring meets the criteria to qualify as a moderate. Unfortunately, there has been no deliberation on the substantive notion of extremism or moderation.

One consequence is that the notion of extremism gets conflated with conceptions of fundamentalism and radicalism. It is possible, and it should be acceptable, for a Muslim to subscribe to fundamental principles of Islam and yet be non-violent. Another corollary is that the British authorities and the West in general, have turned a blind eye on whether the ideology of a moderate Muslim, is indeed correct or indeed, "favourable". In addition, it also seems to emphasise less on whether a Muslim interprets the Quran "appropriately".

The focus, regrettably, is just on ensuring Muslims do not subscribe to any form of violence for political goals. This narrow and short-sighted approach has long-term implications for the West, and countries that have significant Muslim minorities. Emphasis on a brand of politics that diminishes the role of the Muslim citizens it seeks to convince is hardly a panacea in Britain's fight against terrorism.


S.P. Harish is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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